







































Beatriz García Osma and Encarna Guillamón-Saorín WP-EC 2009 -02
Corporate governance and 
impression management in annual
press releases 
Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie EC, coordinada por Matilde Mas, está orientada a la aplicación de 
distintos instrumentos de análisis al estudio de problemas económicos 
concretos. 
 
Coordinated by Matilde Mas, the EC Series mainly includes applications of 
different analytical tools to the study of specific economic problems. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 










Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-1136-2009 
 
Impreso en España (marzo 2009) / Printed in Spain (March 2009)WP-EC 2009-02 
Corporate governance and impression  
management in annual press releases* 
 
Beatriz García and Encarna Guillamón-Saorín** 
 
Abstract 
We study the association between corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases 
(ARPRs). Press releases constitute a timely vehicle to communicate firm performance to third parties. However, 
oftentimes, managers provide self-serving disclosures that attempt to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate 
achievements. Corporate governance mechanisms actively monitor managerial disclosures, improving firm transparency. 
Thus, we predict that strong governance (i) increases firm voluntary release of ARPRs, and (ii) reduces impression 
management in those ARPRs. Tests are based on a sample of Spanish firms. The results confirm that strong governance 
firms are more likely to release an ARPR. In particular, board independence and the existence of remuneration and 
audit committees significantly determine this type of voluntary disclosure. We also show that strong governance limits 
impression management practices, consistent with governance monitoring effectively reducing self-serving disclosures by 
management. Our evidence is consistent with impression management being associated to firm news, suggesting that 
these practices respond, at least partly, to informative motivations. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, impression management, voluntary disclosure. 
JEL Classification: G10, G38, M41. 
Resumen 
En este trabajo investigamos la asociación entre el gobierno corporativo y la manipulación de la presentación de la 
información en las notas de prensa. Las notas de prensa son uno de los medios que usan las empresas para comunicarse 
con terceras partes. A veces, las empresas revelan información con la intención de mostrar una imagen sesgada de la 
empresa. El gobierno corporativo es uno de los mecanismos que controlan la manipulación en la revelación de 
información y mejora la transparencia. Nuestras expectativas son que empresas con mejor gobierno corporativo (i) 
incrementen la revelación voluntaria y (2) muestren menos manipulación de la presentación de información en sus 
notas de prensa. Hemos analizado empresas Españolas cotizando en la Bolsa de Madrid. En particular, hemos 
encontrado que la independencia de los directivos y la existencia de comités de remuneración y de auditoria 
determinan el tipo de revelación de información voluntaria. Estos resultados confirman el papel de control que ejerce 
el gobierno corporativo para reducir efectivamente la presentación engañosa de la información. Nuestros resultados 
también muestran que la manipulación esta relacionada con las noticias de las empresas, lo que sugiere que estas 
practicas responden, al menos en parte, a razones informativas. 
Palabras clave: Gobierno corporativo, manipulación de la presentación, revelación voluntaria 
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  31.   Introduction 
We analyse the association between firm corporate governance mechanisms and 
potentially misleading disclosure practices in firm press releases. Although the importance 
of press releases as part of a firm’s disclosure strategy is widely accepted (Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Francis et al., 2002), academic research on 
this area has been limited. Press releases are easily accessible by the public and represent an 
important instrument for managers to communicate firm performance. However, through 
them, managers can influence the perceptions of third parties for their own benefit (Bowen 
et al., 2005; Brennan et al., 2008). Oftentimes, managers provide self-serving disclosures 
that cast their performance in a positive light or that blame poor performance on temporary 
external factors (Barton and Mercer, 2005). In this paper, we analyze the role of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms in (i) driving the decision to voluntary prepare and issue 
an annual results press release and in (ii) limiting self-serving disclosure practices by 
management in those press releases. Finally, we also study whether impression 
management practices respond to informative or opportunistic incentives. 
Extant research provides mounting evidence of the monitoring and disciplining role 
of governance mechanisms, and highlights the role of boards of directors in facilitating and 
improving the control exerted over senior managers, ensuring that management acts in the 
interests of investors. Prior academic work confirms that efficient governance mechanisms 
limit earnings management practices (Dechow et al., 1996; Peasnell et al., 2005); demand 
more conservative accounting (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2007; 
2008); and increase voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; 
Lim et al., 2007). However, while there is general agreement that governance influences 
accounting information quality, there is limited evidence on its association with voluntary 
disclosure practices, and no previous evidence on whether these mechanisms can influence 
impression management practices in narrative disclosures.  
In the context of corporate reporting, we interpret that impression management 
occurs when management selects the information to release, and presents it in a way that 
distorts readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Neu, 1991; Neu et al., 1998). We 
focus on one type of disclosure: the information contained in annual results press releases 
(ARPRs). These releases are generally issued once a year within the first quarter of the 
following fiscal year. In addition to other information, they normally include a summary of 
  4the financial annual results thus providing stakeholders with valuable information before 
the annual report is available. One important aspect of ARPRs is that their content is 
unregulated, allowing managers full discretion to include the information they consider 
more appropriate and also providing them with a tool with greater potential for impression 
management and higher short-term flexibility than other more rigid publications, such as 
annual reports (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p. 269). Research into disclosure practices in 
press releases is scarce. Some research investigates disclosure practices in quarterly 
earnings announcements (Bowen et al., 2005; Johnson and Schwartz, 2005; Davis et al., 
2008) or in specific press releases, such as those announcing accounting restatements 
(Gordon et al., 2007; Swanson et al., 2008). However, there is limited research on the 
quality and content of disclosures in ARPRs (Henry, 2008). 
We carry out two separate analyses. First, we analyse the association between strong 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm likelihood of voluntarily releasing an ARPR. 
Second, we study the relation between corporate governance and the content of those press 
releases, identifying managerial self-serving practices. Although there are contrary views, 
extant research predicts that managers voluntarily disclose information that is favourable to 
the entity, shying away from full disclosure otherwise (Dye, 2001). Signalling theory 
similarly predicts that managers in well-performing companies signal their superiority by 
increasing transparency in their disclosure and presentation of information (Smith and 
Taffler, 1992; Rutherford, 2003). To the extent that strong corporate governance 
mechanisms (i) demand greater (full) information disclosure to outsiders; and (ii) reduce 
managerial manipulation of the disclosed information, we expect to observe a positive 
association between our measures of strong governance and both firm probability of 
preparing and releasing an ARPR and the quality of the information contained in the ARPR 
(i.e., lower impression management). 
The evidence is based on a sample of 106 Spanish firms. We manually collect all 
available ARPRs of Spanish quoted companies for the year 2000 and analyze them in 
search of potentially misleading disclosure practices. We also manually collect corporate 
governance data from 1999 to 2001 to build a score that aggregates several measures of the 
functioning and characteristics of the board of directors and its delegated committees. 
Using these data, we study if the individual governance variables and the composite 
governance score drive ARPRs disclosure. The results show that firms with strong 
governance mechanisms in place are more likely to issue an ARPR. In particular, board 
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associated to this type of voluntary disclosure. This evidence is consistent with prior work 
on the links between governance and disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007). 
In a second step, we analyse the links between potentially misleading disclosure 
practices  and the strength of firm corporate governance. To measure impression 
management we follow the method in Brennan et al. (2008). We create three composite 
scores that aggregate different techniques of managing impressions. These composite 
scores are used to develop a measure of bias that applies to both qualitative and quantitative 
information. Specifically, we consider: (i) thematic manipulation; (ii) emphasis; (iii) 
performance comparisons; and (iv) selectivity in ARPRs. The results show that strong 
governance lowers the incidence of disclosure practices consistent with impression 
management using qualitative (or narrative) information, whilst the evidence regarding the 
use of quantitative disclosures to produce potentially misleading narratives is less 
conclusive. This is as could be expected. Overall, quantitative disclosures are less likely to 
be managed, as they can be checked back to the financial statements. If management wants 
to manipulate the numbers, other techniques, such as direct manipulation of the financial 
statements are likely preferred. 
Interestingly, our results show that a significant driver of impression management is 
current and forthcoming news. We show that impression management is strongly associated 
to current and future good news about the firm. This is consistent with managers making 
more optimistic disclosures when there are good news to report and when they expect good 
news in the following period. This would suggest that impression management in ARPRs is 
driven, at least partly, by informative motives.  
Our paper adds to two different streams of research. First, we add to the literature on 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure. We analyse if strong governance leads to greater 
likelihood of management voluntarily issuing an ARPR. Prior work on the links between 
disclosure and corporate governance has not studied this type of corporate reporting. In 
addition, we consider different governance variables to those used by prior academic work. 
Our results are consistent with prior literature, and suggest that strong governance is 
associated to greater voluntary disclosure of timely information, although not all 
governance characteristics appear to be determinants of this type of disclosure. This 
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transparency of firm corporate disclosures. Second, our research adds to prior work on the 
role of corporate governance mechanisms. We show that strong governance results in lower 
manipulation of narrative disclosures, and that managerial impression manipulation in 
ARPRs appears to stem, at least partly, from informative motivations. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no prior academic work on the association between impression 
management techniques in narrative disclosures and corporate governance. Finally, we 
provide new evidence on managerial motivations for impression management. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The following section revises 
the prior literature and presents the predictions. Section 3 describes the method and data 
used in the study. The results are discussed in Section 4, and finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background and research questions  
In this section, first we describe impression management and review the existing 
evidence on the monitoring role of corporate governance bodies over corporate financial 
reporting. Second, we present our predictions on the association between corporate 
governance, voluntary disclosure and impression management practices. 
2.1. Impression management in accounting  
  The origin of impression management research is generally attributed to Goffman 
(1959). Goffman explains impression management as the way in which managers manage 
impressions of themselves on their audiences. Impression management serves the basic 
psychological human need of self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980). Hooghiemstra (2000, p. 
60) defines it as a field of study “within social psychology studying how individuals present 
themselves to others to be perceived favourably”. From this broad perspective, both 
individuals and organizations can try to bias the information they provide in an attempt to 
manipulate the image third parties have of them (Leary and Kowalski, 1990). In the context 
of accounting, the aim of impression management is to present a self-serving view of 
corporate and managerial performance (Neu, 1991; Neu et al., 1998). Managerial 
performance cannot be observed directly. This signifies that the providers of finance have 
to base their evaluation of management effort and performance, at least partly, on reports 
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managerial incentives to distort the perception of third parties either directly, by 
manipulating the financial statements (earnings in particular) or indirectly, manipulating 
corporate communications to enhance the perception of corporate and managerial 
performance or at the very least, to minimize the repercussions of negative news 
(Subramanian et al., 1993).
1
Corporate voluntary disclosures are a vehicle with great potential to present self-
serving views of corporate performance, because these disclosures are normally 
unregulated and need not be audited. Managers can distort the perceptions of third parties 
by selecting only positive information to discuss in their communications, by choosing 
which figures to highlight, distorting graphical presentation of data, withholding bad news 
information, etc. Common impression management practices consist of selecting to include 
in their reports the most favourable items within the whole range of information available. 
Also, managers can focus on positive outcomes by selecting a benchmark that allows 
favourable period-to-period comparison, by for example, discussing the most favourable 
change in earnings out of all the possible ones (Schrand and Walther, 2000; Krische, 2005). 
Presentational and visual techniques can also be used to emphasise positive performance 
while downplaying negative outcomes (Beattie and Jones, 2002; So and Smith, 2002; 
Courtis, 2004; Bowen et al., 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). 
Impression management is thus based on the presumption that “preparers 
manipulate transparency by reducing clarity when they wish to disclose less about their 
underlying circumstances” (Rutherford, 2003, p. 189). Therefore, impression management 
translates into a discretionary disclosure strategy that can be operationalised in a number of 
ways.  
Recent research analyses accounting narratives in search of impression management 
practices. One common type of impression management is thematic manipulation in 
accounting narratives, which consists of the use of positive language, keywords and 
statements in financial communications (as opposed to neutral or negative language) to 
convey a positive outlook of performance. Research by Abrahamson and Park (1994) and 
                                                 
1 Thus, there is a clear difference between earnings managements and impression management. Where the 
first focuses on direct manipulation of the numbers disclosed, the later deals with potentially misleading 
presentation of the information. However, both represent serious risks of capital misallocations if successful. 
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negative corporate outcomes by investigating negative language in presidents´ letters. 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) use thematic analysis by reference to keywords. They follow a 
method consisting on word counts (positive and negative keywords) to study the 
relationship between impression management and firm performance. In a second study, 
Clatworthy and Jones (2006) also consider textual characteristics such as quantitative 
disclosures, financial performance variables, personal references, passive sentences and 
future-orientated sentences. These studies conclude that managers behave opportunistically 
when producing accounting narratives.  
Managers may also manipulate impressions by putting the emphasis on the positive 
outcomes. They may achieve this by (i) placing the positive information in a prominent 
location, such as the headline of the press release (Guillamon-Saorin et al., 2008b), (ii) 
repeating the positive information through the disclosure; or (iii) by reinforcing the positive 
information.
2  
Another potentially misleading impression management practice is the selectivity of 
performance numbers to be included in narrative disclosures. In financial reporting, 
selectivity consists of picking the most favourable information from within the whole range 
of information. Managers can also select the benchmark for their performance comparisons 
that permits more favorable comparisons, for example, they may choose to compare this 
year’s growth in sales with last year growth, or with the average growth of the industry, or 
with the growth of a specific competitor, etc. In the extreme, management may create their 
own numbers instead of using those in the financial reports, if those do not allow for 
favorable comparisons. Johnson and Schwartz (2005, p. 924) argue that the use of pro 
forma  earnings (earnings numbers other than those calculated under GAAP) has the 
purpose of “managing readers perceptions of earnings”.  
A basic premise in impression management research is that quantitative data is 
precise in comparison with qualitative expressions that are interpreted by readers and can 
be easily biased (Behn and Vaupel, 1982; Wallsten and Budescu, 1990). However, 
quantitative disclosures are not entirely bias-free. Although numerical disclosures are 
                                                 
2 An example of reinforcing information would be a sentence such as “we expect high growth”, where growth 
is a positive keyword, and “high” acts as reinforcement. For further explanations see Brennan et al. (2008). 
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potentially misleading disclosure practices using quantitative information.  
A number of studies have compared the use of qualitative and quantitative 
information in corporate disclosures, finding mixed evidence. Gibbins et al. (1990) provide 
evidence that firms disclose good (bad) news in a qualitative (quantitative) format. 
However, Skinner (1994) shows that good news is disclosed with quantitative data whereas 
qualitative information is used when management discloses bad news. Research on 
accounting narratives supports the findings by Skinner (1994) and concludes that 
companies with good news include more quantitative performance references in accounting 
narratives than companies facing a bad year (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). News about the 
firm can therefore be considered a significant driver not only of disclosure practices (Dye, 
2001), but potentially also of impression management practices. 
2.2. Corporate Governance and corporate financial reporting 
  Classic agency theory models the relations among the different parties to the firm as 
being fraught with conflicting interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1986). Managers are expected to base their decision-making on the owners’ 
best interests. However, they can act as utility-maximizing agents because they are experts 
with access to superior information about the firm and become better informed about the 
true performance of the company than the principal. These asymmetries in the access to 
information result in adverse selection and moral hazard problems on the part of 
management (Beaver, 1998). For example, managers can act in a self-interested way by 
concealing deteriorating firm performance in their reports, thus avoiding debt covenant 
violations or attaining a higher compensation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Against this backdrop, corporate governance provides the architecture of 
accountability. It encompasses all the provisions and mechanisms that guarantee that the 
assets of the firm are managed efficiently and in the interests of the providers of finance, 
mitigating agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The board of directors is at the 
centre of this decision-making and control system and, therefore, it plays a fundamental 
role in the governance of large companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Corporate boards and 
particularly independent directors monitor and control senior managers, ensuring that they 
act in the interests of investors. Extant research on directors’ influence and characteristics 
confirms that independent directors influence board decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992), 
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detecting and constraining earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996), and demand more 
conservative accounting Garcia et al. (2007; 2008). 
Prior work on the links between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure 
focuses on disclosures in annual reports. The results presented by this literature support the 
notion that strong boards are more likely to pursue policies that ensure higher financial 
transparency, i.e., increased disclosure. The effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
voluntary disclosure in Asian companies has been widely investigated. Focusing on Honk 
Kong firms, Ho and Wong (Ho and Wong, 2001) find evidence that audit committee 
existence is positively associated with greater voluntary disclosure and that the proportion 
of family members on the board reduces voluntary disclosure, whilst Gul and Leung (2004) 
show that CEO duality lowers the level of voluntary disclosures, and that board 
independence ameliorates this negative impact. Analysing the case of Singapore, Cheng 
and Courtenay (2006) demonstrates that board independence increases voluntary disclosure 
in annual reports. More recently, Lim et al. (2007) show that board independence is 
associated with the disclosure of particular types of voluntary information in Australian 
annual reports. They show that board independence affects the disclosure of forward-
looking information, but not the disclosure of non-financial data. Only the work of Eng and 
Mak (2003) reports a conflicting result. They show that an increase in outside directors 
reduces corporate disclosures. 
A growing body of literature examines whether corporate governance mechanisms 
are effective in mitigating opportunistic management behaviour in calculating earnings 
(Beasley, 1996; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; Garcia Osma and Gill-de-Albornoz, 
2007). However, to the best of our knowledge, only one study has investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance and impression management, focusing on graph 
disclosure. Mather and Ramsay (2007) investigate if boards are effective in limiting graph 
selectivity in the financial reports of companies that change CEOs. Their results show that 
boards with a higher proportion of independent directors are more effective in limiting the 
selectivity of graphs, while the concentration of the roles of CEO and chairman of the board 
in the same person is associated with an increase in graph selectivity in the period 
following a change in CEO. Also related to this area of research, Abrahamson and Park 
(1994) investigate the concealment of negative outcomes by companies, a strategy 
consistent with self-interested communication. According to their work, directors have a 
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They hypothesise that outside directors, despite having limited access to firm-specific 
information, limit concealment of negative organizational outcomes. Additionally, 
Corporate Board Member Magazine (2004) identifies as one of the key role of directors to 
evaluate investors communications. Ajinkya et al. (2005) mention that one of the New 
York Stock Exchange listing requirements is that the audit committee of the board 
discusses with management information that is presented in the press releases. 
We expect that corporate governance mechanisms will be associated to firm 
preparation and issuance of ARPRs, as well as to the content of those releases. We briefly 
provide some indication of how ARPRs are prepared. 
2.2.1. Preparation of Annual Results Press Releases (ARPRs). 
ARPRs are firm-initiated earnings announcements usually elaborated by the 
company investor relations department. Although the ultimate person responsible for the 
content of these press releases is the company chairman, they can be signed by a wide 
range of people or departments. These contact details, commonly located at the end of the 
press release, indicate the person or department who has produced the press release. For 
example, in our sample of Spanish press releases, we find either: the press office, an 
internal press department, the corporate communication department or the investor relations 
department details at the end of the body of the ARPRs. However, sometimes, there are no 
contact details at the end of the release. Prior research comments on the difficulties to 
determine the authorship of corporate narratives (Staw et al., 1983; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007). In particular, Staw et al. (1983) argue that letters to shareholders can be 
considered organizational rather than individual communications devices because, although 
they are usually signed by the CEO, some other internal or external parties (i.e. public 
relations officers) may contribute to the final version of the corporate narrative report. 
ARPRs are different from the official filings (i.e. annual report, quarterly results or other 
relevant facts) that companies have to send to the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission 
(CNMV). Once they have been prepared, ARPRs appear in the company Website and are 
also sent to the media. Together with other sources, journalists use these press releases to 
elaborate their news articles. Some companies send the press release to the CNMV 
although this is not required. 
  122.3. Research questions 
  This study focuses on the association between potentially misleading disclosure 
practices (i.e. impression management) in firm ARPRs and corporate governance. First, we 
analyse the likelihood that a firm will release an ARPR. Based on the previously reviewed 
evidence, we expect that strong governance will demand greater financial transparency, i.e., 
increased disclosure. We test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Strong corporate governance increases the probability of firms releasing 
ARPRs. 
We also expect that corporate governance will be negatively associated with the 
incidence of impression management. Managers are expected to use the flexibility inherent 
to narrative disclosures to attempt to favourably impress the reader. To the extent that 
strong governance reduces the information manipulation and increases the precision of the 
information disclosed, minimizing managerial biases, we predict that firms with strong 
governance will release ARPRs with a lower level of potentially misleading disclosure 
practices, i.e., impression management will be less pervasive. Thus, our main hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H2: Strong corporate governance is associated with decreased impression 
management. 
If impression management responds to managerial self-serving biases, we expect 
that strong governance mechanisms will constrain it and there will be a negative association 
between impression management and corporate governance. Impression management could 
also be driven by managerial attempts to convey future information about the firm. To the 
extent that impression management is associated to news about the firm, it could be 
considered informative. This theory is investigated in the context of accounting narratives 
by Staw et al. (1983). They test if the use of self-serving attribution bias in letters to 
shareholders is a genuine expression of optimism rather than a product of impression 
management. Their results support the idea that managers engage in self-serving 
disclosures. Thus, we control in our tests for the existence of news about the firm. 
  133.   Method and sample selection procedure  
We investigate the relation between firm corporate governance mechanisms and 
impression management in corporate disclosures. The release of an ARPR involves 
different departments within the organization as explained in section 2.2.1 above. Their 
ultimate content, however, is the responsibility of management. As a corporate 
communication with potential economic consequences (Tetlock et al., 2008), we 
hypothesize that ARPRs contents are also the responsibility of corporate boards. To the 
extent that boards are concerned with information transparency, comparability and quality, 
they are expected to monitor all major corporate communications. We do not predict that 
there is a specific characteristic of the board or a delegated committee that reviews these 
ARPRs, but rather, that corporate governance acts as the architecture of accountability at all 
levels of communication. Consequently, we use several characteristics of the board that are 
associated with strong governance and positive outcomes in prior research to proxy for the 
influence of governance mechanisms. It is not expected that these governance elements are 
individually responsible for the level of impression management in accounting narratives. 
However, they all may contribute to the strength of the overall governance system, and are 
expected to jointly limit the use of management self-serving disclosures.  
3.1. Measuring corporate governance and impression management 
3.1.1. Measure of corporate governance 
To measure the level or quality of firms’ governance, we use several proxies for the 
functioning and structure of the board of directors that have been identified by prior 
literature as proxies of strong governance. 
(1)  The proportion of independent directors on the board (PrInd). Extant 
research shows that independent directors affect firm decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) 
and fulfil their monitoring role, limiting the incident of fraudulent accounting (Beasley, 
1996), and demanding less aggressive reporting (Peasnell et al., 2005). PrInd is calculated 
as the number of independent directors divided by total board size. 
(2)  The proportion of institutional directors on the board (PrDom). Three 
types of directors commonly sit in Spanish boards: (i) executive; (ii) independent and (iii) 
institutional (dominical) directors. Institutional directors represent the interests of large 
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managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), reducing agency problems. Recent research by 
Garcia and Gill-de-Albornoz (2007) confirms that their presence on the board of Spanish 
firms is associated to lower accrual manipulation. PrDom is calculated as the number of 
institutional directors divided by total board size. 
(3)  CEO influence (CEOinf). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the 
main factor affecting the effectiveness of the board is its independence from the CEO. 
Thus, boards are expected to be more independent and efficient in fulfilling their 
monitoring duties when the chairman of the board is not an executive director. CEOinf 
takes the value of 1 if the chairman is an outside director and zero otherwise.  
(4)  Number of board meetings ( BMeet). To be efficient monitors, boards 
have to be active. The number of board meetings is one way to measure how active a board 
is in its monitoring role (Vafeas, 1999). The greater the number of board meetings (BMeet), 
the more intense the monitoring exerted by the board.  
(5)  Existence of a nomination-remuneration committee (RCom). Dechow et 
al. (1994) show that remuneration committees adjust CEO compensation to minimise 
opportunistic behaviour, and García and Gill-de-Albornoz (2007) show that these 
committees improve the efficiency of the board and the audit committee in constraining 
manipulation practices. RCom takes the value of 1 if the firm has this committee; 0 
otherwise. 
(6)  Existence of an audit committee ( ACom). Audit committees constrain 
earnings management practices (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991). The Olivencia Report 
recommends the creation of an audit committee with responsibility to hire external auditors 
and to facilitate and supervise their work. ACom takes the value of 1 if the firm has an audit 
committee; 0 otherwise. 
(7)  Board size ( BSize). Oversized boards are less efficient in performing 
their duties because of the increasing problems of communication and coordination as 
board size increases, and also, because of the decreased ability of large boards to control 
management. Yermack (1996) suggest that board size affects firm value negatively. BSize 
is the number of members in the board. 
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develop an aggregate score (TotGov) that incorporates these seven characteristics of the 
function and structure of the board of directors. We define our aggregate governance 
measure (TotGov) as the mean of the seven standardized variables. By standardizing the 
variables the tests should not be affected by scale problems associated to differences in the 
measurement of the variables that make up the indexes. It is expected that greater values of 
TotGov will be associated to strong governance structures.  
3.1.2. Measure of impression management 
Impression management is analysed in both qualitative and quantitative disclosures 
following the schema in Brennan et al. (2008). Of the four impression management 
techniques examined in this paper, some involve the analysis of both qualitative and 
quantitative disclosures and others involve the analysis of only qualitative or only 
quantitative disclosures (see Appendix 1 Panel A). Emphasis is analysed by examining 
location, repetition and reinforcement, with reinforcement representing exclusively a 
qualitative concept. One important aspect to bear in mind is that impression management 
cannot be observed directly in accounting narratives but we can observe disclosure 
practices or trends that are consistent with impression management. We can then say that 
managers are using this accounting narratives in a self-serving manner rather than reporting 
performance objectively (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). 
Three composite scores are computed based on the nine basic impression 
management practices described in Brennan et al. (2008) (four qualitative and five 
quantitative). The analysis is based on the study of: (1) keywords/statements and (2) 
quantitative performance numbers. The method to calculate the composite scores is 
summarised in Appendix 1 Panel B. 
The data necessary to calculate the scores come from the manual content analysis 
which is the basic methodology in this study. To calculate the qualitative composite score 
we coded: (1) keywords and statements (positive and negative), (2) repetition of statements 
(positive and negative), (3) reinforcement of keywords (positive and negative), (4) location 
of the information within the press release (most, next-most and least emphasised section of 
the press release). Similarly, the quantitative composite score is based on: (1) amounts 
(positive and negative), (2) repetition of amounts (positive and negative), (3) performance 
comparisons (positive and negative) and (4) location of the information within the press 
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within the quantitative score we also consider selectivity which occurs when the amount 
included in the press release is selected from the profit and loss account. We calculate a 
score including selectivity and a second score excluding selectivity. The qualitative and 
quantitative composite scores are based on weightings to capture all the disclosure practices 
explained above (see Appendix 1 Panel B). The weightings are subjective and the system to 
apply these weightings is developed by Brennan et al. (2008) and empirically tested by 
Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2008a). Guillamon-Saorin et al. (2008a) carry out a sensitivity test 
consisting in varying the weights to check whether these variations affect the results. No 
significant differences are found. 
The three composite scores are further manipulated to capture a measurement of 
bias within the impression management context. The measure of bias (IMSC) is calculated 
as the difference between the total composite scores for all positive qualitative/quantitative 
amounts minus the total composite score for all negative qualitative/quantitative amounts, 
divided by the total composite scores for all qualitative/quantitative amounts (Brennan et 
al., 2008). This measure of bias is similar to that used by Gordon et al. (2007) and Tetlock 
et al.(2008). This is illustrated in the example provided in Appendices 2 and 3. The 
example shows that the disclosures for Azkoyen Company are positively biased. The 
example is simplified by focusing in qualitative information and excluding quantitative 
information. The process to calculate the composite score and the measure of bias for 
quantitative information is similar. 
3.2. Multivariate tests 
  To test the association between corporate governance and voluntary releases of 
ARPRs we estimate the following multivariate logistic regression relating the probability of 
releasing an ARPR to the strength of corporate governance mechanisms and a vector of 
control variables:  
,
1
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           (1) 
where pit is the latent probability that firm i releases an ARPR in year t (yit = 1) and 1 – pit is 
the latent probability that firm i does not voluntary prepare a press release in year t (yit = 0); 
CorpGov is our measure of the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. We run 
  17several specifications of model (1), using alternatively as our CorpGov proxy several of the 
individual governance proxies described above, as well as the composite governance score 
(TotGov). We do so because prior work on voluntary disclosure suggests that not all 
corporate governance characteristics are associated to the extent of voluntary disclosure, as 
previously reviewed. The main coefficient of interest in model (1) is γ1. Under H1, strong 
corporate governance is expected to result in a greater demand for voluntary corporate 
disclosures. Thus, we predict γ1 to be significantly positive.  
The model also includes several controls for the propensity or opportunities for 
management to voluntary disclose information. Following Francis et al. (2008), the 
Controls vector includes measures of firm size (SIZEit), profitability (ROAit) and the 
market-to-book ratio (MTBit). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, 
and it controls for firm-specific factors that influence disclosure policy, such as proprietary 
costs, and ensures that any relation observed between hypothesized determinants and 
disclosure is not an artefact of firm size (Bamber and Cheon, 1998). MTB controls for 
growth opportunities and proprietary costs. Firms facing greater growth opportunities are 
less likely to reveal information (Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Nagar et al., 2003). Finally, 
ROA is calculated as net income divided by lagged total assets, and it controls for the effect 
of poor performance on voluntary disclosure (Skinner, 1994; Nagar et al., 2003). Previous 
research shows that firm performance is positively related to disclosure quality. As an 
additional control, we also include an indicator variable (LOSS) that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm has bad news to report; 0 otherwise. A firm has bad news to report if it reports a 
loss. Theory indicates that a central premise in voluntary disclosure is that firms are more 
likely to provide disclosures when there is favourable information to be communicated to 
the market (Dye, 2001). 
In our second set of tests, we study the association between corporate governance 
and impression management in ARPRs. For this test, we estimate the following 
multivariate OLS regression relating our impression management scores to the strength of 
corporate governance mechanisms and a vector of control variables: 
IMSCit = α0 + α1 GoodGovit + α2 GNewsit + α3 GNewsit+1 + Σ βk Industrykit  
  + Σ δj Controlsjit + εit,                       (2) 
  18where IMSCit is alternatively one of our three impression management scores for firm i in 
year  t;  GoodGov is our measure of the overall strength of corporate governance 
mechanisms. GoodGov takes the value of 1 if the firm’s governance score (TotGov) is 
above the median; 0 otherwise. In model (2), α1 is the main coefficient of interest. Strong 
governance is expected to result in a lower impression management in press releases. Thus, 
we predict α1 to be significantly negative.  
We are also interested in analysing whether impression management responds to 
informative or opportunistic motivations. To test for managerial motivations, we include a 
proxy for the sign of current and future news. GNewsit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
reported earnings for firm i are greater than prior period earnings in year t, and zero 
otherwise; GNewsit+1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if reported earnings are greater than 
prior period earnings in year t+1; 0 otherwise. Similar inferences are obtained if we define 
good news as reporting a profit (earnings above zero), instead of a growth in earnings. This 
definition of GNews  increases the variability of this proxy, as nearly all firms under 
analysis report positive earnings (95.7%), while 75.8% (56.9%) report increases in earnings 
in the current (following) period. To the extent that current positive impression 
management is associated to good news and particularly to future good news, we might 
interpret such management as being informative of positive events in the near future. In that 
case, we would expect α2 and α3 to be positive. Industry is a vector of industry dummies 
that controls for potential industry-specific differences.  
Finally, Controlsit is the vector of j controls for the propensity or opportunity for 
management to manage the information contained in the ARPRs. The Controls vector 
includes measures of firm size (SIZEit), performance as measured by firm fiscal year return 
(RETit), and the market-to-book ratio (MTBit). SIZE and MTB are defined as previously 
explained. We choose RET as our measure of firm performance to avoid any mechanical 
correlations with our proxies of GNews, which are based on changes in profitability. 
Results are however similar if we use ROA instead of RET. 
3.3. Sample selection procedure and data 
The entire population of publicly listed Spanish companies in 2000 is considered for 
this study. Foreign companies and investment societies are excluded from the Spanish list 
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of companies quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange.
3 This results in an initial set of 123 
firms. ARPRs are gathered primarily from the companies’ websites (normally, by following 
the link “Press Office” within the section “Investor Relations”). When the press release is 
not available from this source the Website of the CNMV is used. The CNMV includes a 
section on “relevant facts” where some companies may include their press releases. If none 
of these sources are successful, direct contact is made with the company and the press 
release is requested. This process ensures that all press releases issued by the companies in 
the sample are included in the study.
4 Once all press releases are collected we proceed to 
the content analysis. Corporate governance data is manually compiled from the replies to 
the questionnaires of compliance with the Olivencia Report for the years 1999-2001 from 
the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission (CNMV) Website. If governance data is missing, 
we complete the information using the data of Stuart Spencer Reports. Accounting and 
financial data are downloaded from Extel Finantials. We require three years of consecutive 
accounting data (1999-2001) to be included in the sample. 
The cross-section of these different databases results in 106 firms with accounting, 
financial and corporate governance data available, out of which 55 (51.89% of full sample) 
release an ARPR in 2000, whilst 51 of them do not (48.11%). Table 1 Panels A and B 
provide descriptive evidence of main variables.  
 
4.   Results 
We report two sets of results. First, we study if strong governance mechanisms are 
associated to increased likelihood of firms’ voluntary issuing an ARPR. Second, we analyse 
the links between governance and the content of those ARPRs. To the extent that strong 
governance demands greater information disclosure and lower managerial manipulation, we 
expect to observe a positive association between our measure of strong governance and (1) 
the probability of releasing an ARPR; and (2) the quality of the information contained in 
the ARPR. 
 
3 Open-ended investment companies registered on the Madrid Stock Exchange are excluded due to their 
specific legal accounting framework and the nature of their activities. 
4 All companies contacted either sent us the release requested or replied that they had not issue an ARPR. Table 1 Descriptive statistics of corporate governance variables 
PrInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board. PrDom is the proportion of dominical directors 
on the board. CEOinf equals 1 if the Chairman of the board is not an executive director; 0 otherwise. BMeet is 
the annual number of board meetings. ACom takes the value of 1 if the firm has an audit committee; 0 
otherwise. RCom equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration or nominations committee; 0 otherwise. BSize is 
board size. Values are averaged over the 1999-2001 three year period. ROA is return-on-assets. MTB is the 
market-to-book value. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm has 
bad news to report, defined as reporting losses; 0 otherwise. Panel C reports results of a t- (Wilcoxon) test of 
equality of means (median). 
Panel A: Firms that do not prepare an annual press release (N=51) 
 Mean  Std  Q1  Median  Q3 
PrInd  0.319 0.205 0.177 0.333 0.423 
PrDom  0.448 0.209 0.300 0.442 0.579 
CEOinf  0.327 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BMeet  9.211 3.294 6.667  10.000  11.000 
ACom  0.542 0.485 0.000 1.000 1.000 
RCom  0.411 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BSize  11.193 4.294  8.000 10.000  13.000 
ROA  0.047 0.042 0.016 0.034 0.061 
MTB  2.187 2.808 0.887 1.283 2.279 
SIZE  5.881 1.158 5.374 5.711 6.493 
LOSS  0.034 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Firms that prepare an annual press-release (N=55)   
 Mean  Std  Q1  Median  Q3 
PrInd  0.389 0.229 0.222 0.417 0.545 
PrDom  0.422 0.24 0.286  0.381  0.556 
CEOinf  0.355 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BMeet  8.688 3.198 6.000 8.333  11.500 
ACom  0.730 0.407 0.500 1.000 1.000 
RCom  0.703 0.437 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BSize  13.352 5.524  9.333 11.500  16.000 
ROA  0.009 0.211 0.018 0.039 0.056 
MTB  4.222 8.041 1.265 1.943 3.809 
SIZE  6.672 2.176 5.568 6.555 8.313 
LOSS  0.052 0.223 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel C: Differences across groups (preparers vs. non-preparers) 
  Mean   Median 
 difference  t-stat  p-val    difference  z-value  p-val 
PrInd  0.070 1.67 (0.09)    0.084 1.73 (0.08) 
PrDom  -0.026 -0.58 (0.56)    -0.061 -0.80 (0.42) 
CEOinf  0.028 0.31 (0.75)    0.000 0.39 (0.71) 
BMeet  -0.523 -0.86 (0.39)    -1.667 -0.75 (0.45) 
ACom  0.188 2.08 (0.04)    0.000 1.84 (0.07) 
RCom  0.292 3.26 (0.00)    1.000 3.11 (0.00) 
BSize  2.159 2.22 (0.03)    1.500 2.21 (0.03) 
ROA  -0.038 -1.32 (0.19)    0.005 0.22 (0.82) 
MTB  2.035 1.70 (0.09)    0.660 2.27 (0.02) 
SIZE  0.791 2.21 (0.03)    0.844 2.31 (0.02) 
LOSS  -0.018 -0.38 (0.70)    0.000 0.35 (0.73) 
  214.1. The decision to voluntary release an ARPR 
  Out of the 106 firms analysed, over half of them (55 firms, 51.89%) release an 
ARPR. Table 1 Panels A and B provides descriptive evidence of corporate governance and 
main control variables across preparers and non-prepares of ARPRs. Panel C presents a test 
of differences in means and medians across groups. From this descriptive evidence, it can 
be observed that firms that release an ARPR, on average (a) have significantly more 
independent boards, with a mean (median) value of PrInd of 38.9% (22.2%), versus 31.9% 
(17.7%) for non-preparers; and (b) are more likely to have an audit (remuneration) 
committee, with 73.0% (70.3%) of preparers having them, for only 54.2% (41.1%) of non-
preparers. This is consistent with preparers having generally stronger corporate governance, 
and in line with prior work on corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007). However, not all governance characteristics appear to 
influence voluntary disclosure. This descriptive evidence suggests that some governance 
variables do not weight in this managerial decision.  
The descriptive evidence also suggests that preparers have slightly larger boards, 
with a mean (median) of 13 (9) board seats versus the 11 (8) of non-preparers. Both board 
sizes are within the recommendations of the Olivencia Report (between 5 and 15 members). 
SIZE and MTB are also different across groups. Firms that prepare an ARPR are generally 
larger and have greater growth opportunities. This is consistent with our expectations that 
size and growth opportunities are significant drivers of voluntary disclosure. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients 
are reported above (below) the diagonal. Unsurprisingly, several of the governance 
variables are highly correlated. This is consistent with prior work in Spain by Garcia and 
Gill-de-Albornoz (2007). In particular, ACom and RCom are highly correlated (Pearson 
corr=0.643), as are PrInd and PrDom (corr=-0.812). This evidence supports our decision 
to create a governance score (TotGov) that aggregates all governance data. Because of the 
high correlation between governance variables, we follow prior work by Xie et al. (2003) 
and Garcia and Gill-de-Albornoz (2007) and do not include them all in the same model. 
Table 3 presents results of model (1) using as our GorpGov measure the individual 
governance variables that significantly drive the decision to release an ARPR identified in 
the univariate tests (models 1 to 4). In model 5, we use the TotGov score that aggregates all 
governance information. 
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PrInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board. PrDom is the proportion of dominical directors 
on the board. CEOinf equals 1 if the Chairman of the board is not an executive director; 0 otherwise. BMeet is 
the annual number of board meetings. ACom takes the value of 1 if the firm has an audit committee; 0 
otherwise. RCom equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration or nominations committee; 0 otherwise. BSize is 
board size. Values are averaged over the 1999-2001 three year period. MTB is the market-to-book value. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm has bad news to report, defined as 
reporting losses; 0 otherwise. 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are reported above (below) the diagonal. 
 
  PrInd RCom ACom BSize  CEOinf BMeet  PrDom SIZE  MTB  LOSS 
PrInd    0.290 0.340 -0.155 -0.048 0.122  -0.812  0.169 0.157 -0.122 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.64) (0.23) (0.00) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) 
RCom  0.308    0.643  -0.156 0.055  0.130  -0.127 0.141  -0.072 0.054 
  (0.00)   (0.00) (0.13) (0.60) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.51) (0.62) 
ACom  0.355 0.634  -0.013  0.103  0.119  -0.233  0.148 -0.073  0.018 
  (0.00) (0.00)   (0.90) (0.31) (0.24) (0.02) (0.17) (0.50) (0.87) 
BSize  -0.126 -0.142 -0.005   0.066  -0.856 0.058  -0.500  0.106 0.001 
  (0.22) (0.16) (0.96)   (0.52) (0.40) (0.57) (0.00) (0.34) (0.99) 
CEOinf  -0.075  0.039 0.093 0.083   -0.101  0.198 -0.234  -0.086  0.181 
  (0.46) (0.70) (0.36) (0.41)   (0.33) (0.05) (0.03) (0.43) (0.09) 
BMeet  0.147 0.149 0.138 -0.094  -0.103    -0.086  0.233  0.047  -0.250 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.35) (0.31)   (0.40) (0.03) (0.67) (0.02) 
PrDom  -0.779  -0.126  -0.197  0.048  0.211  -0.109   -0.147 -0.128 0.137 
  (0.00) (0.22) (0.05) (0.65) (0.03) (0.28)   (0.17) (0.24) (0.20) 
SIZE  0.101 0.167 0.167 -0.501  -0.188 0.188  -0.104   -0.071 -0.339 
  (0.35) (0.12) (0.12) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (0.33)   (0.52) (0.00) 
MTB  0.123 0.146 0.227  -0.028 -0.138 0.069  -0.149 0.327   -0.008 
  (0.26) (0.21) (0.04) (0.80) (0.21) (0.52) (0.18) (0.00)   (0.93) 
LOSS  -0.144  0.005 0.002 0.002 0.176 -0.270  0.136 -0.131  -0.035   
  (0.18) (0.64) (0.98) (0.98) (0.10) (0.01) (0.21) (0.22) (0.74)  
 
 
Under H1, we predict that the strength of governance is positively associated to 
ARPRs release. The results of Table 3 confirm our prediction. In particular, the evidence 
suggests that board independence and the existence of a remuneration committee 
significantly determine the release of an ARPR. Specifically, both PrInd and RCom are 
significantly positive across all specifications (PrInd=1.999, p-val=0.08; PrInd=2.359, p-
val=0.05,  PrInd=2.001, p -val=0.08,  PrInd=1.959, p -val =0.08 in models 1 to 4; and 
RCom=0.938, p-val=0.05; RCom=0.937, p-val=0.05; RCom=0.975, p-val=0.04; in models 
1, 3 and 4, respectively). Model 5 presents results of running model (1) using as CorpGov 
proxy the composite governance score (TotGov). The univariate results in Table 1 suggest 
that not  all governance  variables may  be equally  relevant  in  determining  the   voluntary  
  23Table 3 Modelling the decision to release an ARPR 
PrInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board. ACom takes the value of 1 if the firm has an 
audit committee; 0 otherwise. RCom equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration or nominations committee; 0 
otherwise. Corporate governance values are averaged over the 1999-2001 three year period. MTB is the 
market-to-book value. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if the firm 
reports a loss; 0 otherwise. GNews takes the value of 1 if the firm reports earnings above zero in t+1; 0 
otherwise. EQR is change in equity capital in year t+1. DebtR is change in total debt outstanding in t+1. 















 Sign  (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept    -3.909 -3.977 -3.917 -3.613 -2.913 -5.879 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
PrInd  (+) 1.999  2.359  2.001  2.351  .  3.029 
   (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05)  .  (0.04) 
RCom  (+)  0.938 . 0.937 .  . 0.828 
   (0.05) . (0.05) .  . (0.11) 
ACom  (+)  . 0.492 . 0.492 .  . 
    . (0.27) . (0.21) .  . 
TotGov  (+) .  .  .  .  0.657  . 
   . . . .  (0.10)  . 
ROA  (+)  3.720 5.657 3.714 5.677 2.673  14.524 
    (0.30) (0.20) (0.29) (0.16) (0.35) (0.07) 
SIZE  (+)  0.407 0.436 0.407 0.436 0.459 0.559 
    (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
MTB  (+)  0.072 0.067 0.072 0.066 0.086 0.049 
    (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.15) (0.38) 
LOSS  (-)  -0.441 -0.326 -0.433 -0.316 -0.198 0.066 
    (0.38) (0.41) (0.37) (0.83) (0.37) (0.96) 
Gnewst+1 (+) .  .  0.019  -0.045  0.289  0.242 
      (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.30)  (0.77) 
EQR  (+)        -0.700 
         ( 0 . 3 7 )  
DebtR  (+)        0.098 
         ( 0 . 1 2 )  
TACC  (+) .  .        -5.265 
         ( 0 . 2 0 )  
         
N.  Observations  106 106 106 106 106  97 
Concordant  percent  76.7 73.9 76.6 74.4 73.3 79.5 
Pseudo  R-sq.  0.267 0.239 0.266 0.240 0.191 0.335 
 
 
release of an ARPR. However, TotGov is significantly positive in Table 3, although only at 
the 10% level (TotGov=0.657; p-val=0.10). Untabulated results of running model (1), using 
alternatively the other individual CorpGov measures, confirms that BSize, CEOinf, NMeet 
  24and PrDom are not drivers of the decision to release an ARPR. In all specifications, the 
individual governance variables are insignificant. This confirms that governance is a 
significant driver of voluntary release of ARPRs, but that, likely, not all of the considered 
governance variables affect this decision.  
We are also interested in analysing the extent to which voluntary disclosure is 
associated to news about the firm. Prior work suggests that firms are more likely to disclose 
information that is favourable to the entity (Dye, 2001). We control for the sign of current 
and future news about the firm: LOSS and good news in year t+1: GNewst+1, where good 
news is defined as reporting profits, a target that has been identified as relevant for firm 
managers (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Results are consistent with theory in that they 
have the expected signs across most specifications; however they are not significant at 
conventional levels. This is perhaps unsurprising as nearly all sample firms have good news 
to report (see Table 1). The vector of Control variables behave as expected. SIZE is 
significantly positive across all models, confirming that large firms are more likely to 
voluntary disclose information, whilst ROA and MTB are not significant at conventional 
levels. This is consistent with evidence in Francis et al. (2008) and Nagar et al. (2003) who 
show that SIZE is a significant driver of voluntary disclosure but fail to find evidence of 
MTB and ROA driving disclosure. 
As a sensitivity test, we run an additional specification (model 6) that accounts for 
other potential variables that may drive the decision to provide additional information. 
Specifically, we control for the possibility that the firm issues debt or equity in the 
following period, and thus, needs to disclose additional information in the current period. 
We also control for the level of earnings management. To the extent that financial 
information is of low quality, other firm communications may also show signs of lower 
transparency. EQR is the change in equity in year t+1. DebtR is the change in total debt 
outstanding in t+1.
1 As a measure of earnings management, we use total accruals (TACC). 
Table 3 model 6 presents results of this alternative specification. None of the additional 
control variables are significant. The main variable of interest, PrInd is still significantly 
positive (PrInd = 3.016, p-val = 0.01), however, the inclusion of these additional variables 
reduces the significance of RCom, which is still positive but no longer significant at 
conventional levels (RCom = 0.782, p-val = 0.13). 
                                                 
1 Results are similar if we define these variables as taking the value of 1 if the firm equity and total debt 
outstanding increases by 20 per cent or more in t+1; and 0 otherwise. Or even if we set the threshold at 10%. 
  254.2. Corporate governance and impression management 
 Under  H2, we expect that impression management in ARPRs is negatively related to 
the strength of firm corporate governance. As shown in Table 1, 55 sample firms voluntary 
release an ARPR. To run our second test, we classify sample firms into strong and weak 
governance using our composite score (TotGov). A firm is classified as having strong 
(weak) governance if its TotGov score is above (below) the median value. Table 4, Panels 
A and B, provide descriptive statistics of governance variables for firms classified as 
having strong (GoodGov=1) and weak governance (GoodGov=0). Panel C provides a test 
of mean and median differences in governance variables across groups. Strong governance 
firms have more independent directors on the board (PrInd=0.464 vs. PrInd=0.312); are 
more likely to have a non-executive director as chairman of the board (CEOinf=0.506 vs. 
CEOinf=0.198); have boards that meet more frequently (BMeet=9.506 vs. BMeet=7.839); 
and are more likely to have both an audit (ACom=0.976 vs. ACom=0.475) and a 
remuneration committee (RCom=0.940 vs. RCom=0.457). This evidence confirms the 
internal validity of TotGov as an aggregate measure of the strength of corporate governance 
and signifies that GoodGov is a valid measure to segregate sample firms. 
Table 5 provides some descriptive evidence of differences in impression 
management across governance types. Panel A shows that strong governance firms have 
lower levels of qualitative impression management. Specifically, the average number of 
positive (negative) keywords and statements is significantly lower (higher) in strong (weak) 
governance firms. Strong governance firms have an average of 20.286 (2.357) positive 
(negative) keywords in their ARPRs, compared with 24.512 (1.146) in the ARPRs of firms 
with weak governance. Similarly, when we analyse the number of statements, strong 
governance firms have an average of 12.643 (2.000) positive (negative) statements, for 
16.244 (0.951) positive (negative) statements in the ARPRs of weak governance firms. We 
also report differences in the number of positive and negative amounts disclosed in ARPRs. 
The descriptive evidence is again consistent with our expectation, with strong governance 
firms disclosing more negative amounts and weak governance firms including more 
positive amounts in their ARPRs. However, in this case, the differences are not statistically 
significant. For a more precise test of differences in impression management across 
governance groups, we compare our measures across groups: IMSC1, IMSC2 and IMSC3  
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Firms are classified using GoodGov, a composite variable that aggregates seven good governance indicators. 
Firms are classified as having good governance (GoodGov=1) if their aggregate governance score is above the 
annual median. The governance indicators are: PrInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
PrDom is the proportion of dominical directors on the board. CEOinf equals 1 if the Chairman of the board is 
not an executive director; 0 otherwise. BMeet is the annual number of board meetings. ACom takes the value 
of 1 if the firm has an audit committee; 0 otherwise. RCom equals 1 if the firm has a remuneration or 
nominations committee; 0 otherwise. BSize is board size. Values are averaged over the 1999-2001 three year 
period. 
 
Panel C reports results of a t- (Wilcoxon) test of equality of means (median). Reported p-vals are for a two-
tail test. 
Panel A: Firms classified as having good governance (GoodGov =1) (N=28) 
 Mean  Std  Q1  Median  Q3 
PrInd  0.464 0.197 0.283 0.456 0.591 
PrDom  0.386 0.198 0.293 0.360 0.527 
CEOinf  0.506 0.474 0.000 0.583 1.000 
BMeet  9.506 3.161 7.000 8.667  12.167 
ACom  0.976 0.087 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RCom  0.940 0.204 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BSize  13.714 6.216  9.833 11.583  15.000 
Panel B: Firms classified as having poor governance (GoodGov =0) (N=27)   
 Mean  Std  Q1  Median  Q3 
PrInd  0.312 0.238 0.083 0.312 0.444 
PrDom  0.459 0.276 0.281 0.399 0.750 
CEOinf  0.198 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BMeet  7.839 3.066 5.000 7.000  11.000 
ACom  0.475 0.452 0.000 0.500 1.000 
RCom  0.457 0.479 0.000 0.333 1.000 
BSize  12.975 4.792  9.000 11.500  17.500 
Panel C: Differences across governance levels 
  Mean   Median 
 difference  t-stat  p-val    difference  z-value  p-val 
PrInd  0.152 -2.59 (0.01)    0.144 -2.36 (0.02) 
PrDom  -0.073 1.14 (0.26)    -0.039 0.91 (0.36) 
CEOinf  0.308 -2.61 (0.01)    0.583 -2.51 (0.01) 
BMeet  1.667 -1.98 (0.05)    1.667 -2.03 (0.04) 
ACom  0.501 -5.75 (0.00)    0.500 -4.52 (0.00) 
RCom  0.483 -4.84 (0.00)    0.667 -3.97 (0.00) 
BSize  0.739 -0.49 (0.62)    0.083 -0.27 (0.78) 
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N=55 Annual press releases (APRs). Panel A presents average number of positive and negative keywords and 
statements found in the APRs of firms classified across governance levels. GoodGov=1 (GoodGov=0) are 
good (poor) governance firms. It is expected that firms with stronger governance mechanisms in place will 
show a lesser degree of impression management in their APRs. Thus, GoodGov=1 firms are expected to 
include less (more) positive (negative) keywords and statements in their APRs. Difference in means is 
calculated using a t-test. Reported p-vals are for 1-tail tests of significance.  
In Panel A, definition of measures is as follows: Positive/negative keyword: (1) sentence in which word is 
mentioned communicates a negative/positive outcome for the company and (2) the sentence mentions the 
environment affecting the company positively/ negatively. Positive/negative amount: Amounts are 
categorised into positive or negative by reference to prior year results. 
Panel B presents differences of impression management measures across governance levels.. Firms are 
classified using GoodGov, a composite variable that aggregates seven good governance indicators. Firms are 
classified as having good governance (GoodGov=1) if their aggregate governance score is above the annual 
median. Impression management measures are calculated aggregating several scores of qualitative and 
quantitative impression management. IMSC1 is a measure of qualitative impression management. IMSC2 is a 
measure of quantitative impression management including selectivity. IMSC3 is a measure of quantitative 
impression management without selectivity. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide information on how the measures 
are calculated.  
Panel A: Differences in average number of keywords and statements across governance levels 
    Governance Level    Difference across governance levels 
  GoodGov=1   GoodGov=0  Exp. Sign  difference  t-stat  p-val 
Keywords               
Positive keywords  20.286    24.512    (-)  4.226  0.92  (0.18) 
Negative keywords  2.357    1.146    (+)  -1.211  -1.46  (0.07) 
               
Statements               
Positive statements  12.643    16.244    (-)  3.601  1.21  (0.10) 
Negative statements  2.000    0.951    (+)  -1.049  -1.52  (0.06) 
               
Amounts               
Positive amounts  7.333    7.600    (-)  0.267  0.21  (0.42) 
Negative amounts  0.455    0.320    (+)  -0.135  -0.61  (0.27) 
Panel B: Impression management scores across governance levels      
           D i f .  
Mean 
Dif. Median
  GoodGov=1 GoodGov=0  Exp.  t-stat z-stat 
Scores Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.    Sign (p-val)  (p-val) 
IMSC1  0.890 1.000 0.175 0.959 1.000 0.072 (-)  -0.069  0.000 
           2.04 0.87 
           (0.02)  (0.19) 
IMSC2  0.901 1.000 0.155 0.951 1.000 0.131 (-)  -0.050  0.000 
           1.34 1.58 
           (0.09)  (0.06) 
IMSC3  0.903 1.000 0.153 0.954 1.000 0.127 (-)  -0.051  0.000 
           1.35 1.59 
           (0.09)  (0.06) 
  28(see Appendices 1, 2 and 3 for a description of how the measures are calculated).
2 Table 5 
Panel B presents descriptive evidence of differences in IMSC values across governance 
levels. The results are consistent with H2. Mean and median IMSC measures are lower for 
strong governance firms, consistent with good governance limiting impression management 
in ARPRs.  
Table 6 presents a formal test of H2. In Panel A, we use as dependent variable a 
measure of qualitative impression management (IMSC1), and a quantitative measure 
(IMSC2) in Panel B. We use IMSC2 because the quantitative measures are very highly 
correlated and IMSC2 is more complete (includes selectivity). In both panels, the main 
coefficients of interest are GoodGov and our proxies of the existence of good news about 
the firm: GNews and GNewst+1. The results confirm that strong governance is negatively 
associated to impression management. GoodGov is negative across all model specifications. 
In Panel A (GoodGov=-0.057, p-val=0.07 and GoodGov=-0.077, p-val=0.03), in Panel B 
only the specification without Industry controls is significantly negative (GoodGov=-0.064, 
p-val=0.06). This is in line with prior work on impression management that suggests that 
qualitative data is more easily managed, as it is more difficult to check it back to the 
numbers. If management wants to manipulate quantitative numbers it is more likely that 
accounting techniques will be used, coming up with the desired number by, for example, 
using accrual accounting manipulation to increase earnings directly.  
Regarding the association between impression management and news about the 
firm, GNewst is significantly positive in all models (Panel A, GNewst=0.188, p-val=0.01, 
and GNewst=0.178, p-val=0.01; Panel B, GNewst=0.212, p-val=0.01, and GNewst=0.198, p-
val=0.02), Future news about the firm GNewst+1 is also positive and significant in Panel A 
(GNewst+1=0.055,  p-val=0.08, and GNewst=0.066,  p-val=0.08). This indicates that 
managers are more optimistic in their narrative disclosures when current and forthcoming 
news is good. This evidence suggests that impression management responds, at least partly, 
to informative motivations. 
 
                                                 
2 Untabulated correlation coefficients show that all three measures of impression management are highly 
correlated. The correlation coefficient between IMSC1, our measure of qualitative impression management 
and  IMSC2 and IMSC3, our measures of quantitative impression management are of 0.560 and 0.555, 
respectively, whilst the correlation between IMSC2 and IMSC3 is nearly 1. 
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Firms are classified using GoodGov, a composite variable that aggregates seven good governance indicators. 
Firms are classified as having good governance (GoodGov=1) if their aggregate governance score is above the 
annual median. Impression management measures are calculated aggregating several scores of qualitative and 
quantitative impression management. IMSC1 is a measure of qualitative impression management. IMSC2 is a 
measure of quantitative impression management including selectivity. IMSC3 is a measure of quantitative 
impression management without selectivity. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide information on how the measures 
are calculated. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market-to-book value. GNews 
(GNewst+1) takes the value of 1 if the firm has good news to report in the current (next) period, defined 
reporting increases in earnings; 0 otherwise. Industry is a vector of six industry dummies. 
      Panel A: Dep Variable (IMSC1)     Panel B: Dep Variable (IMSC2) 
  Exp  Coef. Coef.    Coef. Coef. 
   sign  (p-val) (p-val)      (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept     0.856 0.915    0.861 0.939 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) 
GoodGov  (-)  -0.057  -0.077  -0.064  -0.051 
    (0.07) (0.03)    (0.06) (0.13) 
RET  (+)  0.013 0.026    0.022  0.01 
    (0.73) (0.27)    (0.61) (0.83) 
SIZE  (-)  -0.015  -0.021  -0.014  -0.021 
    (0.07) (0.03)    (0.11) (0.04) 
MTB  (+)  0.001 0.001    0.001 -0.001 
    (0.80) (0.79)    (0.97) (0.85) 
GNews  (+)  0.188 0.178    0.212 0.198 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) 
Gnewst+1  (+)  0.055 0.066    0.001 -0.019 
    (0.08) (0.08)    (0.45) (0.35) 
           
Industry Dummies  Excluded Included   Excluded Included 
          
N.  observations  55 55    55 55 
R-square     0.28 0.39     0.31 0.37 
 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analyses 
4.3.1. Additional control variables: Information environment 
Prior literature documents that the level of disclosure in a company can be affected 
by the firm’s information environment. Some research proxies for the firm’s information 
environment by its analyst following (for example, Lys and Soo, 1995; for example, Hope, 
2003). We control for the robustness of our findings as follows. Fist, we incorporate into 
model (2) additional variables that may influence the level of firm transparency. In 
  30particular, we control for whether the firm is included in the Ibex 35 ––an Index that 
incorporates the 35 firms with the largest market capitalization quoted in the Madrid Stock 
Exchange (IBEX35). We also control for the number of analysts following the firm 
(ANAFLW). Both IBEX35 and ANAFLW are expected to be negatively associated to the 
level of impression management. Firms incorporated into the Ibex 35 and with large analyst 
following are predicted to face a greater demand for transparent information and thus, to 
provide higher quality disclosures. Slightly over half of our sample firms (54.38%) belong 
to the Ibex 35. The average analyst following in the sample is of 14 analysts. The results of 
this alternative specification are reported in Table 7 Panel A. The inclusion of these 
alternative measures does not affect our main variable of interest: GoodGov continues to be 
negative and significant. IBEX35 and ANAFLW are not significant in any of the 
specifications; this is likely due to the characteristics of the information environment that 
create incentives for transparency already being captured by the other control variables. 
4.3.2. Controlling for self-selection 
It is likely that the decisions to produce an ARPR and to manage the content of that 
ARPR are jointly determined. In the extreme, it could be argued that firms with weak 
corporate governance issue these ARPRs so that they can manipulate third party 
impressions. This would generate a prediction opposite to H1, as firms with weak corporate 
governance will then be more likely to issue ARPRs, generating a negative γ1 in model (1). 
Our results from model (1) appear to reject this possibility; however those results do not 
consider potential endogeneity issues. To control for potential endogeneity concerns, as a 
sensitivity check we run models (1) and (2) as a system of equations. Using the Heckman 
(1979) method, we use equation (1) to calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio that is then used as 
an additional regressor (Lambda) in model (2). This method corrects for potential sample 
self-selection biases. The results of this test are reported in Table 7 Panel B. We run model 
(2) with and without including the Industry controls using the Heckman procedure. In all 
four regressions, Lambda is insignificantly different from zero (Panel A Lambda=-0.014, p-
val=0.44, and Lambda=-0.130,  p-val=-0.14; Panel B, Lambda=-0.016,  p-val=0.43, and 
Lambda=-0.023,  p-val=0.43). All other results are consistent with what was previously 
reported. The main coefficients of interest are consistent with all prior results, if anything, 
they are slightly stronger. Specifically, GoodGov is negatively associated to our impression 
management scores and GNewst is significantly positive in all regression models. This 
suggests that our results do not suffer from self-selection biases. 
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Firms are classified using GoodGov, a composite variable that aggregates seven good governance indicators. 
Firms are classified as having good governance (GoodGov=1) if their aggregate governance score is above the 
annual median. Impression management measures are calculated aggregating several scores of qualitative and 
quantitative impression management. IMSC1 is a measure of qualitative impression management. IMSC2 is a 
measure of quantitative impression management including selectivity. IMSC3 is a measure of quantitative 
impression management without selectivity. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide information on how the measures 
are calculated. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market-to-book value. GNews 
(GNewst+1) takes the value of 1 if the firm has good news to report in the current (next) period, defined 
reporting increases in earnings; 0 otherwise. Industry is a vector of six industry dummies. IBEX35 takes the 
value of 1 if the firm belongs to the Ibex 35 index; 0 otherwise. ANAFLW is the number of analysts following 
the firm. 
Panel A: Additional controls for information environment 
      Dependent Variable (IMSC1)     Dependent Variable (IMSC2) 
  Exp  Coef. Coef.    Coef. Coef. 
   sign  (p-val) (p-val)      (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept     0.864  0.947  0.865  0.929 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
GoodGov  (-)  -0.058 -0.081    -0.066 -0.051 
    (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.14) 
RET  (+)  0.003  0.035  0.014  0.003 
    (0.93)  (0.22)  (0.37)  (0.47) 
SIZE  (-)  -0.021 -0.042    -0.018 -0.019 
    (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.21) 
MTB  (+)  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.001 
    (0.82)  (0.70)  (0.98)  (0.41) 
GNews  (+)  0.203  0.209  0.222  0.198 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gnewst+1  (+)  0.052 0.091    -0.03 -0.024 
    (0.11)  (0.05)  (0.47)  (0.33) 
IBEX35  (+)  0.041 -0.009    0.033 0.023 
    (0.23)  (0.48)  (0.28)  (0.37) 
ANAFLW  (+)  0.001 0.005    -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.42)  (0.13)  (0.48)  (0.42) 
           
Industry Dummies  Excluded Included    Excluded Included 
           
N. observations  55  55    55  55 
R-square     0.30  0.43     0.32  0.39 
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      Dependent Variable (IMSC1)     Dependent Variable (IMSC2) 
  Exp  Coef. Coef.    Coef. Coef. 
   sign  (p-val) (p-val)      (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept     0.889 1.092    0.883 0.969 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) 
GoodGov  (-)  -0.060 -0.104    -0.068 -0.058 
    (0.09) (0.02)    (0.08) (0.16) 
RET  (+)  0.023 0.029    0.021 0.008 
    (0.28) (0.25)    (0.33) (0.42) 
SIZE  (-)  -0.016 -0.035    -0.016 -0.024 
    (0.18) (0.03)    (0.16) (0.12) 
MTB  (+)  0.001 -0.001    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.45) (0.32)    (0.45) (0.40) 
GNews  (+)  0.174 0.176    0.215 0.202 
    (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) (0.01) 
Gnewst+1  (+)  0.066 0.064    -0.001  -0.019 
    (0.06) (0.09)    (0.45) (0.46) 
Lambda    -0.014 -0.130    -0.016 -0.023 
    (0.44) (0.14)    (0.43) (0.43) 
Industry Dummies  Excluded Included    Excluded Included 
N.  observations  55 55    55 55 
R-square     0.29 0.40     0.31 0.37 
Panel C: Different method estimation (Limited dependent variable estimation using QLM) 
      Dependent Variable (IMSC1)     Dependent Variable (IMSC2) 
  Exp  Coef. Coef.    Coef. Coef. 
   sign  (p-val) (p-val)      (p-val) (p-val) 
Intercept     -0.437 0.915     0.861 0.939 
   (0.23)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
GoodGov  (-)  -0.396 -0.077    -0.064 -0.051 
   (0.05)  (0.01)    (0.04)  (0.09) 
RET  (+)  0.093 0.026    0.022 0.010 
   (0.35)  (0.22)    (0.28)  (0.39) 
SIZE  (-)  -0.107 -0.021    -0.014 -0.021 
   (0.04)  (0.01)    (0.08)  (0.02) 
MTB  (+)  0.004 0.001    0.001 -0.001 
   (0.39)  (0.37)    (0.45)  (0.41) 
GNews  (+)  1.305 0.178    0.212  0.198 
   (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gnewst+1  (+)  0.384 0.065    0.001 -0.019 
   (0.06)  (0.04)    (0.45)  (0.33) 
Industry   Excluded  Included    Excluded  Included 
N. observations  55  55    55  55 
Log Likelihood  34.11 37.57     30.54 32.99 
  33As an additional robustness check, we rerun all the results in Table 7 Panel B using 
IMSC3 as our measure of quantitative impression management. The results do not change if 
we use this alternative definition of impression management as our dependent variable. 
This is expected, as untabulated results show that IMSC2 and IMSC3 are highly correlated 
(corr>0.9). 
4.3.3. Alternative specification 
Considering the information contained in ARPRs is generally positive for all firms 
in the sample, sample firms have IMSC scores that are either positive and near to 1. In fact, 
we do not have any cases of ARPR showing a negative bias. This means that IMSC1 and 
IMSC2 have an upper limit bound at 1 and a lower bound at 0, with a number of firms 
taking the value of 1. As a sensitivity test, we rerun model (2) using a limited dependent 
variables approach, in particular, we use a quasi-linearization method to run the model. 
QLM estimation permits Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable, as well as 
estimation of the model defining upper and lower limits for the dependent variable. Results 
of this alternative specification are presented in Table 7 Panel C. Results are consistent with 
our previous evidence. In fact, they are the strongest evidence reported in the paper, 
GoodGov is now significantly negative across all model specifications, both for IMSC1 and 
IMSC2 (IMSC1 models, GoodGov=-0.396, p-val=0.05 and GoodGov=-0.077, p-val=0.01; 
IMSC2 models, GoodGov=-0.064, p-val=0.04 and GoodGov=-0.051, p-val=0.09).  
 
5.   Summary and conclusions 
We analyse the association between firm corporate governance mechanisms and 
potentially misleading disclosure practices in firm ARPRs. Through these releases, 
managers can influence the perceptions of third parties in their own benefit (Bowen et al., 
2005). Oftentimes, managers provide self-serving disclosures that cast their performance on 
a positive light or that blame poor performance on temporary external factors (Barton and 
Mercer, 2005). We analyze the role of internal corporate governance mechanism in (i) 
affecting the likelihood of voluntary releasing an annual results press release and in (ii) 
limiting self-serving disclosure practices by management in those press releases. Finally, 
we also study whether impression management practices respond to informative incentives. 
  34The results show that firms with strong governance mechanisms in place are more 
likely to issue an ARPR. In particular, board independence and the existence of audit and 
remuneration committees are positively associated to this type of voluntary disclosure. This 
evidence is consistent with prior work on the links between governance and disclosure. We 
also provide evidence that strong governance lowers the incidence of qualitative (or 
narrative) impression management, whilst the evidence regarding quantitative impression 
management is less conclusive. Interestingly, our results show that a significant driver of 
impression management is current and forthcoming news. We show that impression 
management is associated to current and future good news about the firm. This is consistent 
with managers making more optimistic disclosures when news are good, or when they 
expect good news in the following period. This would suggest that managerial impression 
management in ARPRs is, at least partly, driven by informative motives. 
Our paper adds to two different streams of research. First, we add to the literature on 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure. We analyse if strong governance leads to greater 
likelihood of management voluntary issuing an ARPR. Prior work on the links between 
disclosure and corporate governance had not studied this type of corporate reporting. In 
addition, we consider different governance variables to those used by prior academic work. 
Our results are consistent with prior literature, and suggest that strong governance is 
associated to greater voluntary disclosure of timely information, although not all 
governance characteristics appear to be determinants of corporate disclosure. This evidence 
should be of interest particularly for standard setters looking to improve the efficiency and 
transparency of firm corporate disclosures. Second, our research adds to prior work on the 
role of corporate governance mechanisms. We show that strong governance results in lower 
manipulation of narrative disclosures, and that managerial impression manipulation in 
ARPRs appears to steam from informative motivations. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no prior academic work on the association between impression management techniques 
in narrative disclosure and corporate governance. Finally, we provide new evidence on 
managerial motivations for impression management. 
Research dealing with management communication strategies helps individuals and 
institutions who invest in companies and depend on truthful information to guide their 
investment decisions. This type of research helps to enrich agency theory as it explains how 
agents use information to pursue self-interested behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989) and how this 
behaviour can be corrected using monitoring mechanisms inherent in corporate governance. 
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The results of the present research have significant implications for accounting. Institutions 
such as board of directors that are entrusted with the task of regulating management 
communication to shareholders to ensure the integrity of the company have, therefore, a 
fundamental role within the company. The quality of the board of directors might be 
considered as an indicator of the quality of information disclosed by the company.  
An area that needs to be extended in relation to accounting narratives is who is 
accountable for their content. We mention in this study the difficulties to attribute 
authorship to press releases. This was also one of the problems found by Staw et al. (1983) 
with letters to shareholders. They claimed that this type of corporate reports should be 
considered organizational rather than individual communications. One of the issues arising 
and that would need of further research in this context is that if we cannot establish the 
person or group of people who produce the press release we cannot be sure about the 
motivation that can lead those people to include impression management practices in these 
releases. Appendix 1 Measuring Impression Management 
Adapted from Brennan et al. (2008). Definition of these measures is as follows: Positive/negative keyword: 
(1) statement in which word is mentioned communicates a negative/positive outcome for the company or (2) 
the statement mentions the environment affecting the company positively/ negatively. Positive/negative 
amount: Amounts are categorised into positive or negative by reference to prior year results (as reported in the 
actual press release) (Bowen et al. 2005). Most-, Next-most, Least-emphasised section: Each press release is 
assigned three levels of emphasis. Following methodology developed by Brennan et al. (2008) Repetition of 
statements: when the same issue is mentioned more than once in the ARPR (repeated statements are not 
included/counted in the positive statements). Repetition of amounts: When the same amount is mentioned 
more than once in the ARPR. (repeated amounts are not included/counted in the positive amounts). 
Reinforcement: A keyword is reinforced when a qualifier is included to emphasise its positive or negative 
meaning. Performance comparison: When the current year amount is accompanied by a benchmark / prior 
year amount showing increase/decrease in the current year amount. Selectivity: Choice/selection of 
performance number, from the highest to lowest amounts on the face of the profit and loss account based on 
monetary value to be included in the press release.  
 
Panel A. Method to measure impression management 
 
Technique Object  of  technique  Measure 
(1) Thematic 
analysis  
Keywordsc/Quantitative amountsd  Number of positive and negative 
keywords 
Number of quantitative positive and 
negative amounts 
(2) Emphasis  (a)Location/positioning/presentation of 
disclosuree,f 
Most-, Next-most, Least-emphasised 
section 
  (b) Repetition of statementsg/Quantitative 
amountsh 
Number of positive and negative 
repetitions of statements 
Number of positive and negative 
repetitions of amounts 




Quantitative amountsj  Benchmark, Prior year amount, Both 
(4) Selectivity  Quantitative amountsk  High, Medium and Low level of 
selectivity 
 








(1) Thematicc  Keywords    1.0   
(2)(a) Emphasise  Location: Most-, next-most, least-emphasised   1.0/0.5/0.0   
(2)(b) Emphasisg Repetition  (statements  only)  0.5   
(2)(c) Emphasisi Reinforcement  (Keywords only)  0.5   
Maximum possible composite score per keyword/statement  2.5   












(1) Thematicd  Disclosure of quantitative performance monetary 
and non-monetary amounts 
1.0 1.0 
(2)(a) Emphasisf  Location: Most-, next-most, least-emphasised  1.0/0.5/0.0  1.0/0.5/0.0 
(2)(b) Emphasish Repetition  0.5  0.5 
(3) Emphasisj Performance  comparisons  0.5  0.5 
(4) Selectivityk  Highest/medium/lowest category of amounts from 
which selection can be made 
1.0/0.5/0.0  
Maximum possible composite score per quantitative amount  4.0  3.0 
Minimum possible composite score per quantitative amount  1.0  1.0 




































6 March 2001 
In 2000 the Azkoyen Group's turnover increased
KW  to 12.3% (23,866 
million pesetas)  
+1
The Azkoyen Group improved
KW+2 its sales by 12.3% during the 2000 financial 
year, with a consolidated turnover of 23,866 million pesetas (143.4 million euros). 
Sales on the foreign markets increased
KW+3 more
 RFW+1 (20.9%) than those in Spain 
(7.9%). Profits before tax were down
KW-1 by 3.9%, a considerable
RFW+2 
improvement
KW+4 on the third quarter.  
Turnover for exports was 8,708 million pesetas (52.3 million euros), which 
consolidates Azkoyen's position on the international markets, with exports 
representing 36.5% of the Group's total sales. 
Profits after tax were 1,583 million pesetas (9.5 million euros). Investments in 
fixed assets were more 
KW+5 than 1,290 million pesetas (7.77 million euros) and 
expenditure on R&D was 1,139 million pesetas (6.8 million euros). In December, 
Azkoyen's shareholders (21,337,500 shares with a nominal value of 100 
pesetas/0.60 euros) received
 15 pesetas gross (0.09 euros) per share, as a dividend 
on account for 2000. 
In the first few days of 2001, the Board of Directors of Azkoyen approved a 
reorganization of its industrial and sales companies (nine in total) into just three 
companies set up as business units with autonomy in terms of assets, finance and 
management: Azkoyen Industrial, Azkoyen Medios de Pago and Azkoyen 
Comercial. 
Specialist analysts viewed that decision as very
RFW+3 positive
KW+6, as they say it 
will improve
KW+7 the Group's position on the global market and its competitive 
capacity. During the first two months of this year, the price of Azkoyen shares 
rose
KW+8 by more
 RFW+4 than 41%, and they were among the ten stocks on the 
Spanish Mercado Continuo that had appreciated
KW+9 the most





KW#+/- : Keyword positive/negative 
ST#+/- : Statement positive/negative 
RPS#+/- : Repetition statement positive/negative 
RFW#+/- : Reinforcement keyword 
  ii / i
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Appendix 2 (continued): Recording coding of qualitative information in Azkoyen ARPR 2000 
   
Analysis of keywords and statements;  
Emphasis - Location/positioning 
 
  Number 
Most-emphasised section of the ARPR 
Positive keywords  1 
Negative keywords  0 
  
Positive statements  1 
Negative statements  0 
  
Next-most-emphasised section of the ARPR 
Positive keywords  3 
Negative keywords  1 
  
Positive statements  2 
Negative statements  1 
  
Least-emphasised section of the ARPR 
Positive keywords  5 
Negative keywords  0 
  
Positive statements  5 
Negative statements  0 
  
Totals 
Total positive keywords  9 
Total negative keywords  1 
Total keywords  10 
  
Total positive statements  8 
Total negative statements  1 
Total statements  9 
  
Emphasis by repetition   
Repetitions of positive statements  1 
Repetitions of negative statements  0 
Total repetitions of statements  1 
  
Emphasis by reinforcement   
Reinforcements of positive keywords  5 
Reinforcements of negative keywords  0 
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Appendix 3 Calculating impression management score using qualitative disclosures 
(Azkoyen ARPR 2000) 
This example is based on Azkoyen press release for year 2000 which includes nine positive and one negative 
keywords. One of the keywords is located in the most emphasised section of the press release (i.e. headline), 
three are placed in the next-most emphasised section (i.e. first paragraph) and five are located in the least-
emphasised section (i.e. main body) of the press release. One positive statement was repeated and five 
keywords were reinforced. Quantitative information is not considered in this example. According to this 
scenario the composite score (SC1) and the measure of bias (IMSC) for quantitative disclosures would be 
calculated as explained below. See Brennan et al. (2008) for a full explanation of how these measures are 
calculated. 
The  measure  of  bias   should  be   interpreted  as  follows:    +1=completely  positively  biased;    0=no  bias; 












Disclosures     
Total keywords disclosed  9 1 10
      
Composite score (SC1 for Azkoyen)     
(1) Disclosure of keywords  9  1  10 
(2)(a) Emphasis – Location:        
          - Most   1 x 1  0  1 
          - Next-most   3 x 0.5  1 x 0.5  2 
          - Least-emphasised  5 x 0.0  0  0 
(2)(b) Emphasis – Repetition of statements  1x 0.5  0  0.5 
(2)(c) Emphasis – Reinforcement of keywords  5x0.5  0  2.5 
Total composite score  14.5  1.5 16
      
Measure of bias (IMSC1 for Azkoyen)     
14.5Positive score –1.5 Negative score = 13Net positive score/16 Total score = + 0.81 
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